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THE SELECTION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES FOR LITIGATION:
USING BUSINESS CYCLE EFFECTS TO TEST THE
PRIEST-KLEIN HYPOTHESIS
PETER SIEGELMAN and JOHN J. DONOHUE 11*
ABSTRACT
Employment discrimination cases filed during recessions are more likely to
settle after filing and less likely to be won by plaintiffs than those filed when
the economy is strong. This model of litigation confirms two predictions of the
Priest-Klein model of litigation. First, relatively weak cases (for either party)
should be more likely to settle. Second, the party with the greater stake in litiga-
tion will have the higher win rate in adjudicated disputes; the special case of even
stakes produces a 50 percent plaintiff win rate. The settlement process does not
produce complete selection, however: the strong version of the Priest-Klein
model predicts a constant win rate over the cycle, but the win rate falls during
recessions. The observed settlement and win rate effects cannot be explained
by changes in the parties' relative stakes over the business cycle, nor by varia-
tions over the cycle in the types of cases brought.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONSIDER the case of an immensely talented basketball player who
loves to play pickup basketball-and most of all loves to win. He runs
into the gym each afternoon, and as soon as 10 players have arrived, he
begins the process of negotiating with an opposing "captain" to deter-
mine how the 10 players will be split into two teams. When the two
captains have agreed on the teams, the basketball games begin. Even
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though our hero is overwhelmingly the most talented basketball player
around, he is disappointed to discover that his teams win only about half
the time. In fact, his rate of victory is no higher than that of the less
talented players who frequent the gym. How could this be?
The answer is fairly obvious. Both captains will of course resist any
effort to stack the opposing team with the best talent. Since our hero is
clearly the best player, he must agree to take relatively weak players on
his side to offset his talents. If he does not make enough concessions,
the other captain will not agree to the sides. The process is analogous to
letting one sibling divide a cake while the other gets to select her preferred
piece. In both examples, the outcome-whether one looks at our hero's
victory rate in basketball games or at the portion of the cake that each
child receives-will tend toward 50 percent.
This same intuition underlies the Priest-Klein model of the selection of
disputes for litigation: the process of negotiation tends to weed out the
extremely weak or extremely strong cases through settlement, thereby
pushing the win rates on those cases that are ultimately adjudicated to-
ward 50 percent.' There is an important exception with respect to the
prediction of a 50 percent win rate, however. Continuing the tale of our
basketball hero who loves to win far more than those around him, con-
sider what would happen to the win rate if our hero were able to offer
side payments to the opposing captain. For 5 dollars, the opposing cap-
tain-who values the money more than the victory-might be persuaded
to accept the weaker team. As a result, our hero-who values the victory
more than the money-would have a win rate in excess of 50 percent.
Of course, in the litigation context, the party who has more at stake
effects the side payment by simply offering more (or demanding less) in
the settlement negotiations, but the predictions are the same: the party
with more at stake will have the higher win rate.
The Priest-Klein model of the selection of disputes for litigation thus
generates the important conclusion that litigated cases are not representa-
tive of the larger population of disputes between parties. The systematic
selection of disputes for litigation has important implications for empirical
1 George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1984). Incidentally, the first author of the Priest-Klein model, George Priest of
Yale Law School, is also the hero in our tale of pickup basketball. For 5 years, the authors
of this article participated in such basketball games at Yale with George. Note one difference
between the forces leading to the 50 percent win rate in basketball games and in litigation:
negotiation in selecting basketball teams selects for teams that are equal and whose win
rates can subsequently be observed. In the case of litigation, settlement negotiations select
out those cases with unequal chances of winning; consequently, win rates will only be
observed in those cases in which the case goes to trial (because settlement has failed).
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work. 2 Simple extrapolation from a sample of litigated cases to the popu-
lation of all cases-or to the larger social realm in which the disputes
arose-is valid only if the sample is random. If cases are not randomly
selected for litigation, then a researcher who uses litigated cases is neces-
sarily studying both the selection mechanism and the underlying popula-
tion of cases simultaneously. Both may be worthy of study, but it is
important to distinguish between the two.3 As an eminent statistician
once wrote, "[If you catch fish with a net having a 6-inch mesh, you are
liable to formulate the hypothesis that all fish are more than 6 inches in
length." 4 Instead of describing the population of fish, such a researcher
would really be making a perfectly valid (although in this case rather
uninteresting) claim about the selection process that generated his
sample.'
One recent paper has reviewed over 20 articles that have found that
plaintiff win rates do not closely approximate 50 percent, which is taken
as empirical refutation of the Priest-Klein model.6 But there are at least
two reasons why it is not easy to test the Priest-Klein model by merely
looking at whether aggregate plaintiff win rates are significantly different
from 50 percent. First, plaintiff win rates above 50 percent can be gener-
2 See John J. Donohue III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 903, 910 (1988) (discussing how an empirical test of discrimination on the part of
judges would need to be informed by the theoretical insights of the Priest-Klein model).
3 A growing body of legal and social science research has come to recognize this and
now explicitly takes account of the fact that generalizing from the subsample of litigated
disputes to the population of all disputes or potential disputes is problematic when selection
is not random. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its
Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24
Law & Soc'y Rev. 1133 (1990) (a comparison of published and unpublished cases reveals
substantial differences between them). See also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab,
What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1989);
James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Policy Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reforms:
What Can We Learn from Claims Data? 7 J. Bus. & Econ. Stat. 423 (1989). The insights
have made their way well outside the law and economics community: attempts to generalize
from data on appellate decisions or published cases are increasingly sensitive to selection
issues. For example, Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice:
An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1073 (1992), contains an extended discussion of selection
effects.
4 Irving John Good, Fallacies, Statistical, in 5 International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences 292 (1968).
5 Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
22 J. Legal Stud. 187, 205 (1993), has a nice analysis of this point in the context of tort
litigation.
6 Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the
Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J.
Legal Stud. (1996, in press).
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ated if large numbers of cases are merely disputes over damages rather
than liability. In the limit, if liability is never an issue, the observed
plaintiff win rate will be 100 percent. Researchers who only can observe
whether the plaintiff was awarded damages will perceive such high win
rates as a departure from the 50 percent rule, although they are in fact
consistent with the view that the damage awards should lie close to the
mean of the damages predicted by the two parties. Second, if the parties'
stakes in litigation are not equal, then the Priest-Klein model predicts
that plaintiff win rates will vary systematically from 50 percent. There-
fore, even though many scholars have found win rates for different types
of litigation that diverge from 50 percent,7 this may well be perfectly
consistent with the Priest-Klein model if the parties with the higher win
rates-for example, employment discrimination defendants-tended to
have a higher stake in the litigation. Since it is difficult to assess the
relative stakes of parties in litigation, the examination of raw win rates
has neither undermined nor validated the Priest-Klein hypothesis.
In this article, we use data on employment discrimination cases to test
a different prediction of the Priest-Klein model. Instead of looking for a
50 percent win rate, we ask whether settlement is a random process or
instead acts to screen out extremely weak (or strong) cases. In the latter
case, the win rate for the cases that are ultimately adjudicated will vary
systematically from the win rate that would be observed if all cases were
tried.' Using the time-series record of all employment discrimination liti-
gation in federal trial courts over a 20-year period, we demonstrate six
points:
I Some of the major contributions in the large literature are Theodore Eisenberg, Testing
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal
Stud. 337 (1990); Stewart Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, The Influence of Judicial Back-
ground on Settling and Winning Cases and a Study of the Disputing Pyramid (unpublished
manuscript on file with us); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319(1991); Harold W. Elder, Trials and Settlements in the Criminal Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Dispositions and Sentencing, 18 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1989); Gary M. Fournier
& Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach, 71 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 189 (1989); and Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the
Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. Legal Stud. 145 (1990).
8 There are alternative theories of selection, developed in the spirit of the Priest-Klein
model. For the most part, these yield roughly similar conclusions about selection patterns,
although they do not all predict a 50 percent win rate, even with identical stakes. See, for
example, Hylton, supra note 5; Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?
14 J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985). The Priest-Klein model assumes that actors do not behave
strategically, in that they do not take into account the effects of their behavior on their
opponent's behavior. For a review of a broad array of economic models of litigation that
includes those that attempt to control for the strategic behavior of the parties, see Robert
D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolu-
tion, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067 (1989).
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1) The plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination cases is far be-
low 50 percent. According to the Priest-Klein model, this implies that,
on average, defendant employers have a larger stake in this type of litiga-
tion than do plaintiffs.
2) A slumping economy tends to elicit a substantial increase in the
number of employment discrimination cases filed.
3) These incremental (recession-induced) cases tend to be much weaker
than average; that is, the plaintiff win rate for the incremental cases (if
they were all litigated to a final verdict) would be substantially lower than
the win rate for all other cases.
4) The Priest-Klein model predicts that weaker cases settle at a dispro-
portionately high rate; and, in fact, cases filed during recessions do have
higher settlement rates.
5) The higher settlement rate of the recession-induced cases camou-
flages, but does not completely obscure, the lower plaintiff win rate for
employment discrimination cases filed during business downturns.
6) Changes in the composition of cases, in relative stakes, in the
amount of discrimination, or in legal doctrine cannot explain our findings
of significant business cycle effects on settlement and win rates.
Note that our fifth finding contradicts the strongest form of the selec-
tion hypothesis-if selection at the settlement stage were complete, the
plaintiff win rate (hereafter, the win rate) would depend only on the par-
ties' relative stakes and would be completely unrelated to anything else.
In other words, if the Priest-Klein selection filter operated flawlessly, all
the additional weak employment discrimination cases filed during busi-
ness downturns would settle. In that event, the win rate of those cases
that were fully litigated would be the same across the business cycle. In
fact, although the win rate fluctuates significantly less than the settlement
rate-thereby evidencing partial selection-the win rate does vary sys-
tematically with the health of the macro economy, falling during slumps
and rising during booms.
In Section II of this article, we present a simple economic model in
the Priest-Klein tradition that demonstrates a link between awards to
successful employment discrimination plaintiffs and the unemployment
rate just prior to when their cases are filed. We use this model to predict
how the business cycle affects the number of cases filed, the settlement
rate, and the plaintiff win rate. Section III tests these predictions using
time-series data on all employment discrimination cases filed in federal
district courts between 1977 and 1988. Section IV considers and rejects
several other explanations for our findings. It shows that the cyclical
patterns we observed cannot be attributed to cyclical changes in the com-
position of cases, changes in legal doctrine or in sympathies for plaintiffs,
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changes in the actual amount of discrimination, or changes in the relative
stakes of the parties to the litigation. Thus, the article provides strong
evidence for the selective weeding out of weak cases through settlement
that the Priest-Klein model predicts.
II. THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
IN THEORY
A. An Overview of Employment Discrimination Litigation
and Settlement
This section has two goals. First, it suggests a plausible link between the
business cycle and the back pay damages available to prevailing plaintiffs
in employment discrimination cases. In short, damages are higher in slumps
because plaintiffs are more likely to experience longer spells of unemploy-
ment at such times. Second, it combines this model of damages with a
Priest-Klein-like model of filing, settlement, and litigation to derive testable
predictions about the effect of the business cycle on the volume of cases
filed and the rates at which these cases settle or are won by plaintiffs.
In adapting the Priest-Klein model to the particular context of employ-
ment discrimination litigation, we begin with a simple model of the plain-
tiff's decision to file a lawsuit, based on a given dispute. Our model differs
slightly from George Priest and Benjamin Klein's original formulation for
two reasons. First, we use a specification that captures the one-way fee-
shifting rules under which most employment discrimination litigation pro-
ceeds. To this extent, our formulation is merely a special case of the more
general model, modified to show how settlement and win rates are deter-
mined under the rules that are relevant for the body of cases we examine.
In addition, however, we draw a distinction that Priest and Klein do
not, which requires us to use some slightly different terminology. Priest
and Klein "regard a dispute as 'litigated' only if a verdict is rendered;
all terminations of the dispute short of a verdict are regarded as 'settle-
ments,' "' Their homogeneous definition of settlement elides all of the
stages in the development of a dispute prior to formal adjudication. That
is, they do not distinguish between potential plaintiffs who never pursue
any sort of legal claim and those who settle or 'drop' their disputes after
filing a complaint.' 0 The only distinction they recognize is between dis-
9 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 6.
10 For a perceptive discussion of the ontogeny of disputes, see William L. F. Felstiner,
Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming... ,15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980-81).
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putes that "vanish" at some point after the incident generating the dis-
pute occurs and those "litigated" (adjudicated to a final verdict)."
Because our test of the Priest-Klein selection hypothesis derives from
an exploration of the differences in case quality over the business cycle,
we need to adopt a somewhat different descriptive notation and set of
assumptions that allow us to distinguish between potential cases that are
never filed and those that are filed but subsequently settle. The details of
the model are spelled out in detail in Sections 1iB and 11C below. Here,
we give a broad overview.
Like Priest and Klein, we begin with a dispute between two parties. If
the (risk neutral) plaintiff believes that her legal claim against the defen-
Idant has a positive expected value, she files suit. Otherwise, she drops
her claim.' 2 Once suit has been filed, the parties can try to negotiate a
settlement. Settlement occurs if the least the plaintiff is willing to accept
to settle (her "asking price," or "ask") is less than the most the defen-
dant is willing to offer (his "bid"). Consistent with Priest and Klein,
therefore, we define "litigation" as the pursuit to final adjudication of a
case that has already been filed. 3
" Technically, the issue is how one chooses to describe a dispute that never generates
the filing of a lawsuit because its expected value to the plaintiff is less than zero. One might
think of this situation as a "settlement" (with a zero payment by the defendant). Such
treatment would be consistent with the Priest-Klein view that whenever the expected value
of litigation to the plaintiff (by assumption, negative in this case) is less than the expected
burden on the defendant from litigation (which in our model is always positive), a settlement
will be reached. This point is made, somewhat opaquely, by Wittman, supra note 8, and
responded to by Priest (George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning
from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. Legal Stud. 215 (1985)). In the present context, the real issue
is not whether the unilateral decision by some plaintiffs to drop their disputes eliminates or
reduces the selection effect at the settlement stage. Rather, it is whether we can usefully
analyze the separate stages that take place as the original large volume of disputes is
narrowed to the much smaller volume of adjudicated cases. For an empirical and theoretical
exploration of this decomposition, see Hughes & Snyder, supra note 3.
12 Of course, plaintiffs can and do drop cases (without any compensation from defen-
dants) after they have been fied. We treat this as settlement behavior because in our data
there is no way to distinguish postfiling drops from settlements. As Hughes & Snyder,
supra note 3, point out, this is not an entirely satisfactory way to proceed.
13 Both our formulation and Priest and Klein's are arbitrary and necessarily conceal some
crucial aspects of dispute processing. First, as Felstiner et al., supra note 10, suggest, a
lot of the action in the sociolegal system occurs before a dispute becomes a filed case.
Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to analyze these early stages of dispute processing,
but that should not be taken to mean that the early stages are unimportant. In fact, since
there are over 10 times as many charges of discrimination filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (a necessary prerequisite for filing a Title VII suit in
federal court) than lawsuits in federal court each year, there is presumably a great deal of
settlement before cases ever reach a federal district court. Second, if any strategic behavior
is involved, the precise timing of when offers can be made will obviously have important
consequences (see, for example, Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 8). Thus, requiring as a
matter of theory that settlement occur only after a case is filed is unlikely to be innocuous.
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FiGuRE .- A schematic representation of two versions of the selection process. a, our
version. b, the Priest-Klein version. "Ask" = expected value to the plaintiff; "bid" =
expected value fo the defendant.
A schematic overview of our model, and a comparison with the Priest-
Klein formulation, is provided in Figure 1. The big difference between
the two models is that our formulation allows for intermediate stages
between the initial dispute and the final adjudication. This additional layer
of complexity enables us to analyze the filing and settlement behavior of
litigants and the quality of their cases by showing how these factors are
influenced by the state of the economy.
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B. The Plaintiff's Filing Decision
Our model begins with the following definitions:
p, = plaintiff's estimate of her expected probability of winning (at the
time she files suit);
P2 = plaintiff's estimate of her expected probability of winning at the
time the defendant makes his settlement offer;
Pd = defendant's estimate that the plaintiff will win the lawsuit at the
time it is filed;
C = plaintiff's expected costs of litigation, including possible souring
of work relationship, at the time the file/drop decision is made;
C2 = plaintiff's expected costs of litigation at the time the settle/litigate
decision is made (since some costs have already been sunk, C2 <
C);
Cd = defendant's cost of defending the suit;
w = plaintiff's daily wage in job for which she was rejected (fired, not
hired, and so on);
U = unemployment rate; and
D = duration (in days) of plaintiff's unemployment spell following
rejection. Higher unemployment rates are associated with longer
durations of unemployment spells. Thus, D = D(U), with dD/dU
>0.
Notice that monetary damages (= wD) are limited to back pay 14 and that
the size of the back pay award depends on the duration of the plaintiff's
14 "[Tlitle VII provides only equitable remedies; damages other than back pay are not
recoverable." See Paul N. Cox, The Law of Employment Discrimination: Cases and Com-
mentary 5-17 (1987), citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980); Harrington
v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979); Pearson v. W. Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976). The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 substantially changed the kinds of damages allowed under Title VII and other
antidiscrimination statutes, but these changes are not relevant for the cases in our sample,
all of which closed before the law took effect in November 1991.
Reinstatement, promotion, and changes in employment practices are also available as
remedies, but our data suggest that plaintiffs secure them through settlement or judgment
far less frequently than they receive monetary settlements or awards. See John J. Donohue
III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991).
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) offers a limited version of punitive
damages: conditional on a proof of willful violation of the statute, double recovery of actual
damages is available. See Cox, supra, at 23-14. See, for example, Fortino v. Quasar Co.,
751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. I11. 1990) (awarding double damages as liquidated damages for
willful violation of the ADEA). Punitive and compensatory damages as such, however,
seem not to be available under the ADEA. See Cox, supra, at 23-16. Suits under §§ 1981
and 1983 do allow for punitive damages in addition to back pay.
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unemployment spell, D, which is in turn a positive function of the unem-
ployment rate, U.15 We assume that the litigation is subject to Title VII
one-way fee-shifting rules. 6 In this situation, the expected value of the suit
to the plaintiff at the time the file/drop decision is made-her stage I "ask-
ing price--is
A, = p, wD(U) - (1 - pl)CI. (la)
Equation (la) simply states that the expected value of the lawsuit to the
plaintiff equals the probability of success times the backpay award, minus
the probability of losing times the costs of bringing the suit.'7
Following Priest and Klein, we ignore strategic considerations and as-
sume that potential plaintiffs will sue if and only if the expected value of
suit is positive. The necessary condition for a suit to be filed can therefore
be expressed as A, > 0.
As it stands, however, the model is incomplete: to close it, we need a
theory of how plaintiffs develop their estimate of the probability that
they will win, p,. A key feature of the Priest-Klein model is an elegant
description of how plaintiffs estimate their probability of victory, which
can then be substituted into equation (la) in order to ascertain whether
the necessary condition for filing a suit is met. The derivation of fit-
I5 For recent evidence on the relationship between the duration of unemployment spells
and the business cycle, see Mark Dynarski & Steven M. Sheffrin, The Behavior of Unem-
ployment Durations over the Cycle, 72 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 350-56 (1990); and Michael
Baker, Unemployment Duration: Compositional Effects and Cyclical Variability, 82 Am.
Econ. Rev. 313-21 (1992). Both studies conclude that the duration of average unemploy-
ment spells increases with the unemployment rate. Using panel data, the former finds that
the elasticity of duration of unemployment with respect to the unemployment rate is be-
tween 1.03 and 1.46. Controlling for heterogeneity in types of workers at a more aggregate
level, the latter finds that the overall elasticity of duration with respect to the unemployment
rate is about 0.6; it is almost 0.75 for workers who are unemployed because they have lost
their jobs. Both studies reject the theory that the observed increase in average duration
during slumps is attributable to a rise in the proportion of workers who remain unemployed
for long spells.
16 In Title VII litigation, winning plaintiffs recover their legal fees from defendants, while
winning defendants do not collect legal fees from plaintiffs unless the plaintiff's action was
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith." See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
17 The back pay award is the daily wage (w) times the number of days of unemploy-
ment (D). Note that employment discrimination plaintiffs frequently retain lawyers on
contingency fees. In such cases, the plaintiff will not explicitly care about the expected
costs of bringing the lawsuit: (I - p1 )Cl. Contingency fee attorneys will screen the cases,
however, to make sure that their expected fee, p1 C1, at least equals the opportunity cost
of their time plus any incidental expenses such as filing fees, depositions, and expert witness
fees.
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essentially, the endogenous process of expectation formation-is de-
scribed in the Appendix.
C. The Settle/Litigate Decision
While plaintiffs act unilaterally in deciding. whether or not to file suit,
the interaction of both parties will determine whether the case is settled
or litigated. In the Priest-Klein model, the settle/litigate decision emerges
in a simple and natural way from uncertainty over the probability that
the plaintiff will win the case.
We adopt the Priest-Klein/Landes-Posner convention about settlement:
absent strategic behavior, settlement will occur whenever the minimum
amount the plaintiff is willing to accept for settling the case is less than the
maximum amount the defendant is willing to offer. The former quantity-
the plaintiff's stage 2 "asking price"--is simply the expected value to the
plaintiff if the case were to proceed to trial (rather than settle).
Since we allow the plaintiff to have access to new information and new
costs at the time of the settle/litigate decision, we define the second stage
asking price of the plaintiff as' 8
A 2 = I 2wD(U) - (1 - 0 2 )C 2 . (lb)
Similarly, the defendant's maximum "bid" will be equal to his expecta-
tion of what he will have to pay if litigation occurs, which is simply:' 9
B = P5d[WD(U) + C 2 ] + Cd. (2)
18 Again, the endogenous calculation of /2 is described in the Appendix. We take the
costs at this stage as different from those considered by the plaintiff when deciding whether
or not to file suit in the first instance. Some costs are already sunk by the time the suit is
filed and are thus irrelevant in making the settle/litigate decision.
Plaintiffs may also get new, and presumably better, information about the size of their
potential award or about the defendant's culpability as the suit unfolds. We incorporate
this additional information by giving the plaintiff a second draw from an error distribution
with a smaller variance. One might consider the case in which the parties ex ante take
explicit account of the sequential unfolding of costs (and information). This approach alters
the underlying structure of the model in fundamental ways, as Bradford Cornell shows
using an options pricing model of litigation (Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue:
An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. Legal Stud. 173 (1990)). We ignore such complications
here.
19 The calculation of the defendant's estimate that the plaintiff will prevail is identical to
the plaintiff's calculation described in the Appendix, except that the defendant has a differ-
ent draw from a (possibly different) error distribution. That is, the defendant's estimate
that the plaintiff will win is
Pd = PR(Y' > 01 ]d) = G(Y' + Fd),
where Ed is also a normal random variable with zero mean (but with a variance that is
not necessarily equal to that of the plaintiff's error distribution), and G is the cumulative
distribution function for this variable.
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Settlement will then occur whenever A 2 < B; litigation occurs whenever
this condition does not hold.
D. Theoretical Predictions
The model outlined above allows us to make three predictions about
the effects of the business cycle on employment discrimination litigation.
First, case filings will increase as the unemployment rate rises. Second,
these additional recession-induced cases will likely be of weaker quality.
And third, if they are in fact weaker than the average cases filed in the
nonrecessionary times, then we would expect to see a disproportionate
number of them settle.
1. Case Filings. A rise in unemployment should lead to an increase
in the number of suits filed. At the time when the plaintiff is deciding
whether to file suit, we saw in equation (la) above that only three vari-
ables were relevant to the plaintiff's decision: the plaintiff's probability
of victory (pl), the estimated damages (wD), and the litigation costs (C,).
If we can assume that the expected litigation costs are relatively uniform
and known across all cases at the prefiling stage, then we are left with
only two variables that describe every conceivable case of employment
discrimination. Thus, each employment discrimination case could be
thought of as representing a point on a graph in which the estimat-
ed probability of victory is measured on the horizontal axis while the
estimated damages are measured on the vertical axis, as shown in
Figure 2.
Given the arbitrary, but not unreasonable, assumption that plaintiff's
litigation costs (C1) equal $5,000, we can then use equation (la) to solve
the necessary condition for filing, A, > 0. Figure 2 demonstrates that at
an unemployment rate of 6.04 percent (1 standard deviation below the
average during the period covered by our data), any case falling in the
unshaded northeast region of the graph will have a positive expected
value and will therefore meet the necessary condition for the plaintiff to
bring an action. Cases that fall in the two shaded areas will not be filed,
either because they have low expected probabilities of victory, low esti-
mated damages, or both.
Figure 2 also illustrates the effect of an increase in the unemployment
rate on the region of cases that meet the necessary condition for filing.
When the unemployment rate rises, the duration of unemployment spells
also increases, which prompts a proportionate increase in the damages
that successful employment discrimination litigants will receive. The
black area in Figure 2 reveals the set of cases that would not have met
the necessary condition for filing under the lower unemployment rate,
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but do satisfy this condition at the higher rate because longer spells of
unemployment on the part of potential plaintiffs lead to higher potential
damage awards.2" Consequently, a rise in the unemployment rate should
unambiguously increase the number of cases that will be filed.
2. Case Quality. Figure 2 can also help us explore what happens to
the quality of the incremental employment discrimination cases generated
by a rise in unemployment. Note first that the black area encompasses a
band of cases across the entire array of predicted probabilities of plaintiff
success less than one. Put differently, the higher rate of unemployment
could conceivably induce additional very low probability cases that now
promise substantially higher damage awards, or very high probability
cases that were previously close to, but just below, the threshold for
filing and have now risen above it. Figure 2 only shows the combinations
of p, and the level of damages (wD) that meet the necessary conditions
for filing but gives us no information about the distribution of cases within
this set.2 ' Thus, it is logically possible that the average quality of the
incremental cases (in the black area) will be higher, lower, or the same
as that of the cases filed at the lower unemployment rate.22
Therefore, in the absence of information about the distribution of cases
across the various combinations of probability of success and damages,
we cannot predict a priori whether on average the incremental cases
will be of lower quality-that is, have lower plaintiff win rates if fully
litigated-than the base cases. But simple inspection of Figure 2 reveals
20 The assumptions underlying these calculations are as follows. First, the initial unem-
ployment rate is taken to be 6.04 percent, which then rises to 8.66 percent. These figures
are 1 standard deviation below and above the mean unemployment rate of 7.35 for the
period covered by our data. Second, this 43.4 percent increase in the unemployment rate
is deemed to generate a 43.4 percent increase in the mean level of damages (because of the
attendant longer spells of unemployment). See note 15 supra for estimates of the elasticity
of the duration of unemployment spells with respect to the unemployment rate, which we
take to be unitary. As a result, the cases falling in the black area of Figure 2, which
previously would not have met the necessary condition for filing, would now meet the
condition because of their enhanced expected damages. Accordingly, every case that would
have been brought when the unemployment rate was low will still be brought, and an
additional band of cases represented by the black area will now be eligible for filing.
21 Think of Figure 2 as analogous to a chart showing all the possible combinations of
height and weight for adult Americans. Each point on the chart represents one possible
combination, but the number of Americans actually associated with each possible combina-
tion varies widely. For example, the combination 6 feet, 170 pounds is presumably much
more common than the combination 7 feet, 170 pounds.
22 While we showed empirically that an increase in the unemployment rate does in fact
lead to an increase in the filings of low probability cases, our earlier suggestion that this is
necessarily true applies only when the amount at stake is the same for all cases filed in a
given quarter. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics:
Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 709,
749 n.75 (1993).
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TABLE 1
THE AREA OF THE REGION FROM WHICH ADDITIONAL
CASES ARE BROUGHT AS THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
RISES, BY PROBABILITY OF PLAINTIFF VICTORY
Total
Area (%)
For the interval of p1:
.05-.25 2,132.1 68.9
.25-.5 670.3 21.7
.5-1 292.2 9.4
.05-.5 2,802.4 90.6
.05-1 3,094.6 100.0
NoTE.-This table computes the area in Figure 2 by identi-
fying the cases that are induced by an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate from I standard deviation below to 1 standard devia-
tion above the mean. These areas represent the actual
distribution of the incremental cases only in the unlikely event
that the cases are uniformly distributed in the probability-of-
victory/damages space.
that the area that defines the support of the incremental cases is substan-
tially greater for low probability cases than for high probability cases.
The intuitive reason for this has already been adumbrated: because of
Title VII's one-way fee-shifting rules, virtually all very high probability
cases will be brought, and therefore the induced effect from the higher
unemployment rate will operate less powerfully for cases that fall into
this region.
Table 1 presents the area of the black region of Figure 2 for various
probability intervals.23 This tabulation reveals that more than two-thirds
of the area from which the incremental cases are drawn constitutes low
probability cases (pt < .25), and over 90 percent of the area constitutes
cases that have less than a 50 percent chance of success. If we knew that
actual cases were uniformly distributed across the black area, then we
would know that the incremental cases would be relatively weak cases.24
Even without this information, though, the relatively larger area for low
23 The area is given by
f ($5,000/p - $5,000)(1 - 1/1.434)dp,
where $5,000 represents the plaintiff's expected litigation expenses, and the increase in
the unemployment rate-and hence in the size of the damages-is 43.4 percent. Note that
we cannot integrate over the interval beginning with probability 0, since the function is
undefined at that point. Therefore, we integrate over the interval beginning with probability
.05.
24 For a uniform distribution, the median win rate would be 15.4 percent.
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probability cases is at least suggestive-although not dispositive-that
the incremental cases will tend to be weaker than the base cases.
3. Settlement Behavior. Once we have a prediction that the incremen-
tal cases filed during recessions will be weaker than the base cases filed
during nonrecessionary periods, we are then in a position to use the
Priest-Klein model to predict what happens to these weaker filed cases.
As Priest and Klein wrote, "In litigation ... agreement over the outcome
leads parties to drop out .... Where either the plaintiff or defendant has
a 'powerful' case, settlement is more likely because the parties are less
likely to disagree about the outcome. Settlement negotiations will most
often fail, however, where the dispute is most problematic, whatever the
applicable decision standard." 25
Since we are positing that the cases filed during recessions tend to
be relatively weak, we would expect them disproportionately to "drop
out"--that is, to settle. We can test this proposition by determining
whether the settlement rate on the incremental cases is in fact higher
than the settlement rate on the base filings. Moreover, if the selection is
complete, so that all of the weaker-than-average cases are settled, then
we would see the same win rate on those cases that were actually liti-
gated, regardless of whether the case was brought during a boom or a
recession. If selection is not perfect, however, we would expect to see
lower win rates for cases filed during recession.
III. TESTING THE SELECTION EFFECTS MODEL
A. What Constitutes a Test of the Model?
If, contrary to the selection effects model, settlement were truly ran-
dom, then no "explanatory variable(s)" should be able to explain it. That
is, no characteristics of a case-including in particular the unemployment
rate at the time the case is filed-should aid the researcher in predicting
whether or not that case will settle. By contrast, the Priest-Klein selection
model implies that the settlement rate should be predictable, since the
parties will settle a case based on their (unbiased) expectations of the
outcome, which in turn are based on the relevant case characteristics.
Since we have predicted that higher unemployment leads to weaker cases
that are disproportionately settled, a loose empirical test of the selection
model for our sample of employment discrimination cases can thus be
conducted by regressing a dichotomous settlement variable (1 if the case
settles, 0 otherwise) on the unemployment rate at the time of filing. If the
25 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 17.
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coefficients are insignificantly different from zero, we reject the selection
model; if the coefficients are statistically and economically significant,
this constitutes evidence in favor of the model.26
The selection model also makes predictions about the predictability of
win rates in adjudicated cases. In fact, the strong version of the model
makes exactly the opposite prediction about win rates as it does about
settlement rates. If the selection of disputes at the settlement stage is
complete, then the outcomes of litigation should be random (or virtually
so). Thus, the outcome of a litigated case should be almost completely
unpredictable on the basis of any of its characteristics if Priest-Klein, or
some other model based on selective settlement, obtains.27 In the extreme
version of the Priest-Klein hypothesis, the aggregate win rate is deter-
mined purely by the relative stakes of the parties-it will be 50 percent
when these stakes are equal-and no case-specific variables predict a
case's outcome. However, as Priest and Klein recognize, selection will
not generally be so complete as to rule out any influence of exogenous
variables on the win rate.28 With less-than-complete selection, therefore,
litigated cases will not be purged of all predictable elements, so some
variables may explain the win rate.
We therefore have four testable hypotheses stemming from our modi-
fied version of the selection model:
1. The filing rate should be higher in slumps than in booms, and the
incremental cases induced by the higher rate of unemployment should on
average be weaker than the base cases.
2. The settlement rate for filed cases should be higher in slumps than
in booms, thereby establishing nonrandom settlement.
3. (a) The observed win rate on adjudicated cases should either not
move at all over the business cycle (perfect selection), or (b) this ob-
served win rate should be lower in slumps than in booms (partial se-
lection).
2 The test is a loose one for the following reason. Suppose, for example, that we were
to find no effect of unemployment rates on the average settlement rate. It might be perfectly
possible that some other variables (at either the aggregate or case level) could nevertheless
explain settlement very well. For instance, using the plaintiff's height or the temperature
on the date the case was filed as explanatory variables would produce zero coefficients,
but one could not interpret such a result as evidence of randomness in settlement because
the wrong independent variables were considered. Conversely, if our regression test gener-
ates statistically significant coefficients using a limited number of explanatory variables,
then this should be taken as relatively strong evidence in favor of the selection model.
27 Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 24, make a similar point after examining their
data: "more noise comes from predicting court judgments than from predicting settlements
(as the selection-effects model would predict), but a tune can be heard through the noise."
8 See the discussion in Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 22-24.
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4. Sensitivity to the business cycle should increase as one moves down
the disputing pyramid. That is, the win rate should be least sensitive to
the cycle, while the filing rate (or number of suits filed) should be most
sensitive, with the settlement rate somewhere in between.
B. Specification Issues
The best way to test the selection model would be using data on individ-
ual cases.29 Unfortunately, our data do not contain much useful informa-
tion about individual cases (except for their outcomes and the date on
which they were filed). The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(AO) did not begin keeping track of the statutory basis for individual suits
until 1988, and such important information as the type of discrimination
alleged by the plaintiff (hiring, firing, pay, and so on) or the basis of the
alleged discrimination (race, sex, age, and so on) is simply not available
for individual cases.
Thus, we resort to a different strategy. Instead of testing whether the
occurrence of settlement (or plaintiff victory) for an individual case can
be explained by that case's characteristics, we examine whether the ag-
gregate settlement or win rate can be explained by characteristics of a
group of cases. By grouping cases by the quarter in which they were
filed, we can use an explanatory variable that is common to all the cases
(the unemployment rate for the quarter), while still maintaining the di-
chotomous dependent variable (settle versus litigate or win versus lose).30
29 For obvious reasons, individual-level data are much more capable of detecting whether
there are explanatory variables that matter in predicting settlement and win rates.
30 Thus, we define the settlement rate for quarter t as 1 - (PWINI + DWIN,)/FILE,,
where PWIN, is the number of cases filed in quarter t that are ultimately won by the plaintiff,
DWIN, is the number ultimately won by the defendant, and FILE, is the number of cases
filed in quarter t. The win rate is then PWIN/(PWIN, + DWIN). A handful of cases were
coded as both parties win. We experimented with treating these cases as settled, as plaintiff
wins, defendant wins, or dropping them altogether. They had no significant impact in any
specification, so we ignored them altogether.
In estimating our settlement and win rates we use weighted logit. This is appropriate
when using grouped data in which the underlying model is discrete (plaintiff loses or wins),
but the observed dependent variable is a proportion, which occurs when "a number of
respondents have the same values of the independent variables and the observed dependent
variable is the proportion of .. . [respondents] with individual responses equal to 1"
(William Greene, LIMDEP Manual, at 19.3 (1986)). This is precisely the situation with the
Administrative Office data, since we have no information about each individual case that
would enable us to distinguish it from any other filed during the same quarter (except for
the outcome).
To see that weighting is necessary consider two different quarters: in the first, two cases
are litigated and the plaintiff wins one of them, so the win rate in this quarter is 0.5 (50
percent). In the second, 100 cases are litigated and plaintiffs win 50 of them. Again the win
rate is 50 percent; clearly, however, the estimated win rate for the second quarter is more
precise (has a lower variance) and should be given a larger weight in estimating the overall
win rate across all periods than the first. The grouped data specification corrects for this
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C. Data
The data used in this article are drawn from the data tapes of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, from which we have extracted
the complete record of all employment discrimination suits filed in federal
district courts between July 1969 and June 1989.1' For present purposes,
the key pieces of information on each case are its filing date (which allows
us to aggregate the data by the calendar quarter in which the case was
filed) and the outcome of each case that was closed after July 1, 1978.32
D. Empirical Evidence
1. Regression Results. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present our estimates of the
effect of the business cycle on the number of cases filed, the settlement
rate, and the win rate. All three tables support the hypothesis that a
version of the selection model operates for federal employment discrimi-
nation cases.
Table 2 demonstrates that the volume of cases filed does indeed depend
on the state of the economy, with each extra percentage point of unem-
heteroscedasticity by weighting each quarter's observation on WINRATE by the number
of cases in the sample that were adjudicated in that quarter-that is, weighting by (PWIN,
+ DWIN,). For further treatment, see William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis 666-71
(1990). Because our grouped data do not take account of any heterogeneity in the character-
istics of cases in explaining settlement or litigation verdicts, our coefficient estimates are
potentially subject to aggregation bias. The aggregate data also prevent us from taking
account of selection effects in the way that Hughes and Snyder suggest (using selection
models with individual case data and correlated error terms in the settlement and win rate
equations).
31 For a more complete discussion of this data, see Donohue & Siegelman, supra note
14; and Eisenberg, supra note 7. The category used by the Administrative Office to catego-
rize these suits does not perfectly track the notion of employment discrimination prevalent
in the legal or social science communities. The AO definition of "Civil Rights, Employment
cases" includes all cases filed under Title VII, § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, and the Equal Pay Act, which are the major federal laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, and age. The AO also includes some
additional cases brought by government employees alleging due process violations, but
these are a very small share of the total.
32 Other data available for each case include jurisdictional basis (federal defendant, fed-
eral plaintiff, or general), procedural progress (stage at which case terminated), and so on.
One unfortunate limitation of the data is that the AO did not record the outcomes of cases
that closed before July 1, 1978. Furthermore, outcomes are not available for cases that
were still pending when the AO data tape was compiled in July 1989. As a simple, albeit
imperfect, correction for any duration-based selection problem, therefore, we eliminated
all cases filed before March 1, 1977 or after July 1, 1988, leaving us with 46 quarters of
data. If there is any relationship between the duration of a case and its outcome, using all
closed cases will increasingly overinclude short cases as the filing date approaches the date
the tape was compiled (June 30, 1989). This could impart a spurious time trend to the
results. The reverse is true for cases filed before July 1, 1978. Using all the cases for which
we had outcome data did not significantly change the results.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSIONS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYMENT CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS FILED IN FEDERAL COURTS,
1977:2-1988:3, CORRECTED FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
EQUATION
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 13.00 212.79 71.07 -54.58 90.79 - 144.38
(.01) (.14) (.14) (-.12) (.20) (-.37)
TIME (quarter since
1969:3) 51.03 60.43 -2.06 -2.92 -13.64 3.70
(1.00) (.95) (-.09) (-.14) (- .68) (.22)
TIME2  - .34 -. 45 .19 .19 .30 .13
(- .71) (- .75) (.88) (1.01) (1.57) (.82)
Unemployment rate in
current quarter (%) -49.35 -15.84 -57.79* . .
(-1.31) (-.53) (-2.02)
Unemployment rate in
previous quarter ... ... 173.30* 135.11* 116.13*
(5.96) (4.88) (4.29)
Unemployment rate
lagged 2 quarters ... ... ... 102.33* 79.50* 168.91*
(3.62) (2.96) (8.51)
Summary statistics:
0 .77 .84 .36 .36 .35 .10
Adjusted R 2  .55 .71 .85 .88 .88 .85
Durbin-Watson 2.06 1.96 1.96 1.97 1.94 2.04
SouRcEs.-Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Data Tape (number of employment discrimination
suits); Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (nonseasonally adjusted unemployment
rate).
NOTE.-N = 46 quarterly observations; t-statistics are in parentheses. For all regressions, the
dependent variable was the number of original jurisdiction employment civil rights suits (purged of
duplicate docket numbers) filed per calendar quarter. The Durbin-Watson statistic is for the trans-
formed residuals; the adjusted R2 is for the ordinary least squares (untransformed) equation.
* Significant at the .05 level.
ployment generating roughly 170 additional cases filed after 2 quarters
(from col. 6). In Table 3, we see that the settlement rate also depends on
the business cycle: as the unemployment rate rises so does the settlement
rate, and the unemployment coefficients were (jointly) significant at the
1 percent level in all four of the specifications. For example, based on
the regression in column (5), we estimate that a 1-percentage-point in-
crease in the unemployment rate raises the settlement rate (for cases filed
2 quarters later) by 2.3 percentage points.33
Table 4 reveals that when the unemployment rate rises, the win rate
of litigated cases falls. In all the regressions, the unemployment rate
33 Measured at mean values of the regressors, a 1-percentage-point increase in the unem-
ployment rate raises the settlement rate from 64.6 percent to 66.9 percent.
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TABLE 3
GROUPED LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF SETTLEMENT RATE ON TIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES,
1977:2-1988:3
MODEL
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant .43* .37* .38* 3.07* 3.13*
(12.48) (10.54) (10.83) (19.93) (19.51)
TIME (quarter
since 1969:3) .007* .007* .007* -. 10* -. 11*
(10.68) (11.68) (11.35) (-16.79) (-16.43)
TIME 2  ... ... ... .001* .001*
(18.10) (17.65)
DETRENDED
UNRT(- 1) ... ... -. 05* ... .02
(-4.19) (1.23)
DETRENDED
UNRT(-2) ... .04* .08* .10* .09*
(6.98) (7.10) (14.64) (7.21)
- (Log likeli-
hood) 45,923.7 45,899.2 45,890.4 45,732.0 45,731.2
Likelihood ratio
tests ... X2(I) = 49.0 X2(2) = 66.6 X2(2) = 383.4 X'(3) = 385.0
NoTE.-t-statistics are in parentheses. The grouped logit specification is based on 46 quarterly
observations of the settlement rate but uses all 80,063 observations on case outcomes (whether or not
the case was settled). There were 74,029 cases closed during this period, of which 50,892 were settled.
Detrended unemployment rates (DETRENDED UNRT) were obtained as the residual from a regres-
sion of the unemployment rate on a constant, TIME, and TIME 2. The likelihood ratio tests are two
times the absolute value of the difference between the log likelihood for model 1 and the competing
model. They are distributed X2(j), where j is the number of restrictions relaxed (variables added) in
moving from model I to the alternative model.
* Significant at the .05 level.
coefficients are significant (either jointly or individually) and have the
appropriate sign. Again using the regression in column (5), we find that
an extra I percentage point of unemployment lowers the win rate by
about two-tenths of I percentage point.34
2. Interpreting the Results. Taken together, the results in Tables 2,
3, and 4 provide fairly strong support for a modified version of the selec-
tion model. The number of filed cases is indeed higher in booms than
slumps, the settlement rate is higher, and plaintiffs win a smaller share
of cases filed at such times. Overall, the selection of cases through settle-
ment does seem to produce a progressively smaller business cycle effect
as we move up the disputing pyramid: the volume of litigation is most
34 Measured at mean values of the regressors, a -percentage-point increase in the unem-
ployment rate lowers the plaintiff win rate from 20.6 percent to 20.4 percent.
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TABLE 5
THE PREDICTED EFFECT OF A HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ON THE QUARTERLY FILINGS
AND DISPOSITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Number of Settlement Win Rate
Cases Rate (for Those Adjudicated)
(1) (2) (3)
Base filings 1,367 61.3 20.9
Incremental cases 515 84.6 16.4
Total 1,882 67.7 20.3
NOTE.-The sources of the regression equations that are used to estimate case filings, the settlement
rate, and the plaintiff win rate are, respectively, Table 2, model 5; Table 3, model 5; and Table 4,
model 5. The estimates presented in this table are obtained by using mean regressor values and
unemployment rates that are I standard deviation below and above the mean unemployment figure
for the period covered by our data-from 1977 through 1988. The base filings are at an unemployment
rate of 6.04 percent; incremental cases are induced by a 2.62-percentage-point increase in the unem-
ployment rate; and the total is at an unemployment rate of 8.66 percent.
sensitive to the business cycle, the settlement rate is less sensitive, and
the win rate is least cyclical of the three, just as the theory predicts.
While we have documented the existence of a statistically significant
relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of cases
filed, and their settlement and win rates, the evidence presented thus far
might create the impression that the magnitude of these effects is small.
We should quickly correct this misimpression. For example, Table 5 pre-
sents the effect of a hypothetical increase in the rate of unemployment
from 6.04 percent (the base level) to 8.66 percent, a sizable but certainly
not unprecedented jump.3 5 The table shows that an average quarter with
a 6.04 percent unemployment rate generates about 1,367 employment
discrimination suits. Raising the unemployment to 8.66 percent increases
the number of cases by 515, to 1,882. In other words, the 43 percent
jump in the unemployment rate has caused an increase in employment
discrimination cases of almost 37.7 percent, an elasticity of 0.87.
Moreover, while the increases in the win and settlement rates associ-
ated with higher unemployment might seem small, this is because the
comparisons of the overall rates of settlement and plaintiff victory ob-
scure the marginal effects. The cases that fall into the white region of
Figure 2 (computed on the assumption that the unemployment rate was
6.04) settle at a rate of 61.3 percent. When the unemployment rate rises
to 8.66 percent, the settlement rate on the total population of cases-the
35 Over the I -year span beginning in 1977 for which we have data on case outcomes,
the mean rate of unemployment was 7.35 percent, and the figures of 6.04 percent and 8.66
percent represent I standard deviation on either side of the mean.
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combined white and black regions-is 67.7 percent. This overall increase
of 6.4 percent looks relatively small. But recall our assumption in dis-
cussing Figure 2 that all of the cases filed when the unemployment rate
was low (the base filings) would also be filed when it was high. Suppose
we make the further assumption that the settlement and win rates for
these base filings are the same at both points in time. If so, then all of
the changes in the settlement and win rates that appear in our regression
estimates are caused by the different settlement and win rates of the
incremental cases that are induced by the higher rate of unemployment
(the cases in the black area of Figure 2).36
Since our regression estimates tell us how many cases are induced by
the higher unemployment, and we know the settlement and win rates for
both the base and total populations, it is a simple matter to compute the
settlement and win rates on the incremental cases as a weighted aver-
age.37 These figures are presented in Table 5, which shows that there
are substantial differences between the settlement and win rates of the
incremental and base cases. For example, the settlement rate is 61.3
percent on the base cases, but 84.6 percent on the incremental cases.
The 43 percent rise in the unemployment rate has thus led to a marginal
increase in the settlement rate of 23.3 percentage points or 38.0 percent
(= 23.3/61.3), for a marginal elasticity of 0.876. This is consistent with
the predictions that these incremental cases are weaker than average and
therefore should settle at higher rates.
Similarly, a comparison of the 20.9 percent win rate for the base filings
with the 16.4 percent win rate for the incremental cases confirms that the
36 The assumption that the base filings would have the same settlement rate when the
unemployment rate rose is conservative for the following reason. If the unemployment rate
rises, the likely damages received by successful plaintiffs will rise. But higher damages-
unless they are offset by proportionately higher litigation costs-should encourage litigants
to go to trial, thereby causing the settlement rate to drop. Thus, if the settlement rates of
the base filings actually fell during the recession, then our estimates of the increased settle-
ment rates on the incremental cases must be biased downward. Note, however, that the
assumption is only conservative if the concerns expressed in Section IVA infra are not a
serious problem.
31 In other words, we know that
PT x total cases = PB X base filings + P, x incremental cases,
where PT is the overall probability of settlement, PB is the probability of settlement for the
base cases, and P, is the overall probability of settlement for the incremental cases. Solving
for p, reveals that the probability that the cases that are induced by the higher unemployment
rate will settle is 84.6 percent-substantially above the settlement rate of 61.3 for cases
filed during low rates of unemployment. In a similar fashion, one can also compute win
rates for the high and low unemployment rate periods, thereby permitting the calculation
of the win rate on the adjudicated incremental cases induced by the higher unemployment
rate.
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induced filings are in fact weaker. Indeed, had it not been for the higher
rate of settlement on the weaker cases, the difference in win rates would
have been even greater than that shown in Table 5.38 Thus, we have
confirmed that a higher rate of unemployment induces a substantial num-
ber of additional cases, that these incremental cases are weaker than
average, and thus have higher settlement rates and lower plaintiff win
rates.
Note what we have established. Higher unemployment rates induce a
significant rise in the number of cases, but these incremental cases are
substantially weaker than the average cases filed when unemployment
rates are lower. The Priest-Klein theory suggests that weaker cases
should be disproportionately weeded out-and they are! The settlement
rate for these incremental cases is over 23 percentage points higher than
for the base cases. But the Priest-Klein screen does not keep out all of
the lower-quality cases. The remaining incremental cases that have not
settled are won by the plaintiffs at a rate of only 16.4 percent as opposed
to the base plaintiff win rate of 20.9 percent. We have therefore estab-
lished the existence of the screening mechanism that the Priest-Klein
model predicts, but we have shown that it does not completely filter out
all of the additional low-quality cases.
IV. REJECTING SOME ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RESULTS
We have attributed our findings to the operation of a Priest-Klein settle-
ment screen that partially obscures the lower case quality of the incre-
mental cases induced by a rise in the unemployment rate. We must also
consider four other factors not so far discussed that might link the busi-
ness cycle with the settlement and win rates, however. Conceivably, the
settlement and win rates could be affected by cyclical changes in (1) the
composition of the caseload, (2) legal doctrine, (3) the average fault level
of defendants (the amount of discrimination), or (4) the parties' relative
stakes. This section demonstrates that none of these factors can actually
explain the observed pattern of win and settlement rates.
M What would the plaintiff win rate have looked like had the incremental cases settled
at the same rate as the base filings? In this situation, 213 of the incremental cases would
have been tried instead of only 80. Obviously, if those 133 cases (213 - 80) included a
substantial portion of very low probability cases, then the adjusted win rate for the incre-
mental cases would have been considerably lower than the 16.4 percent we estimated for
these cases. If the average win rate on these 133 settled cases would have been, say, 8.2
percent, then if they had not settled, the win rate for the 213 cases would have been only
11.3 percent compared to 20.9 percent for the base filings. If plaintiffs would have won
none of the 133 extra settled cases, then the incremental win rate would drop to only 6.2
percent.
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A. Cyclical Changes in the Composition of the Caseload
The previous section used the model depicted in Figure 2 and the
Priest-Klein analysis to interpret our regression findings. The validity of
our story rests, however, on the implicit assumption that any increase in
filings induced by a recession-the incremental cases-comes from the
dark area of cases in Figure 2. This theoretical assumption would seem
to be buttressed by the fact that the recession-induced cases are weaker
than those filed when the economy is stronger.
But an alternative explanation is possible. Rather than being driven by
the model that we depict in Figure 2, the cyclical patterns in settlement
and win rates could simply be caused by changes in the types of cases
that are brought across the business cycle. If the entire composition of
employment discrimination cases changes with the unemployment rate,
then we have not properly identified the "incremental cases" that are
added on to the constant "base filings."
To illustrate this problem, imagine the following scenario. Suppose
that cases filed during recessions are largely allegations of discriminatory
discharge. In prosperous times, however, fewer workers are fired, and
most of the discrimination complaints are instead allegations of, say,
sexual harassment. This story has a certain plausibility to it: when the
job market is tight, workers might be more willing to complain about
conditions in their current job, knowing that it is more costly for their
employer to retaliate against them at such times. If this sort of composi-
tional shift actually occurs, however, then our analysis could be substan-
tially off target. For instance, we attribute the declining win rate during
slumps to a decline in case quality. Instead, however, it might be attribut-
able to a compositional shift toward types of cases with different win
rates .
In order to reassure ourselves that our Figure 2 model is appropriate
and that the observed changes in settlement and win rates over the busi-
ness cycle are not caused by changes in the composition of discrimination
cases, we examined a number of different types of evidence.
1. The Worker Benefits Effect. Recall that our discussion of Figure 2
19 Discharge cases might have lower win rates than harassment cases for either or both
of two reasons. First, the rules governing proof might differ across the two types of cases.
If the strict version of the Priest-Klein model prevails, then differences in rules should not
cause differences in plaintiff win rates. But if there is incomplete selection of cases through
settlement, plaintiffs might nevertheless do worse in litigated harassment cases than in
litigated discharge cases. Alternatively, relative stakes might differ between the two kinds
of cases. For example, if plaintiffs have higher stakes relative to defendants in harassment
cases than they do relative to defendants in discharge cases, the Priest-Klein model predicts
that plaintiffs will be more successful in harassment cases.
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assumes that the increase in filings during recessions comes from a rise
in potential damages caused by the longer spells of unemployment suf-
fered by most plaintiffs. We have elsewhere referred to this phenomenon
as the "worker benefits effect. "I But as we have also indicated, employ-
ment discrimination case filings could increase in recessions if the number
of incidents that give rise to litigation, such as discharges and layoffs,
grew in recessions-the "incidents effect." This concern is alleviated by
our earlier finding that the worker benefits effect, rather than the incidents
effect, was the explanation for the countercyclical pattern.4' Thus, we
have strong reasons to believe that Figure 2 captures an important reason
for the procyclical behavior of employment discrimination case filings.
2. Direct Tests for Cyclical Composition Changes. We can also di-
rectly test whether the average characteristics of employment discrimina-
tion suits filed during periods of high unemployment differ uniformly, and
not just at the margin, from those filed when the unemployment rate is
low. We propose the following test.
Consider the percentage distribution of cases filed in quarter t. Let Yt,i
index the distribution along some dimension: for example, Y might be
the type of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff (hiring, firing, demotion,
4 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 722.
4' We based this conclusion on the following findings, which undermine the importance
of the incidents effect.
1) The upturn in federal court filings following a rise in unemployment occurs faster than
would be possible given the delays needed to process unemployment discrimination cases
through the EEOC. If a rise in the unemployment rate caused an increase in the duration
of unemployment for those who had already been unemployed for some time, however,
then the relatively short lag between changes in unemployment rates and filing rates is
reasonable. In other words, the increase in case filings does not occur because of an increase
in the type of incidents that lead to suit. It occurs because more of the employment discrimi-
nation cases that are already in the pipeline after the filing of a charge with the EEOC
proceed to federal court if the economy slips into recession. The recession apparently
changes litigant behavior concerning pre-existing disputes.
2) Suits against the federal government are countercyclical even though discharges and
layoffs from the federal government are not. If the federal government does not lay off its
workers countercyclically, but the number of suits against the government nevertheless
follows the cycle, this again suggests that the unemployment rate-unemployment duration
(worker benefits) effect is at work.
3) The volume of charges of discrimination brought before the EEOC is not countercyli-
cal. Alleged acts of discrimination seem to generate EEOC complaints at a relatively con-
stant rate, with less sensitivity to the business cycle than experienced by district court
filings of discrimination cases. Months after the alleged act occurs, however, aggrieved
workers are more likely to advance their claim to a federal court if the economy has
worsened and they have had difficulty finding alternative employment.
4) The amount of damages awarded to successful plaintiffs in cases tried to a judge
increases with the unemployment rate.
For a more detailed explanation of these findings, see Donohue & Siegelman, supra note
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conditions of employment, retaliation, other). In this case, Y, 2 would be
the percentage of cases in quarter 1 that fall in category 2 (firing).42
A test of whether the composition of cases changes over the business
cycle could then be conducted by regressing the Y,,i on business cycle
variables (lagged detrended unemployment rates). If the coefficients on
the unemployment variables are not significantly different from zero, then
we reject the view that the observed changes in win rates and settlement
rates are simply caused by different types of cases being filed at different
points in the business cycle. Since the dependent variable is discrete and
multivalued, we use multinomial logistic regression rather than ordinary
least squares.43
Table 6 presents results from logistic regressions designed to test
whether the business cycle influences the composition of the employment
discrimination caseload. Since the Administrative Office data set does
not contain any information about the composition of the caseload, we
utilized a different source for these regressions-a survey conducted by
the American Bar Foundation (ABF) in which we examined roughly 1,100
randomly selected employment discrimination cases in seven cities
across the United States. 44
Table 6 reports likelihood ratio tests for whether the business cycle
42 If there are K categories, then for any quarter t,
K
SY .i = I.
If K = 2, we have the standard logistic regression with grouped data.
43 Once again, having multiple observations for each quarter and a dependent variable
that is a proportion of cases falling into each category, we use the grouped data formulation
(described earlier in the WINRATE analysis).
For some of the variables, it is possible for the case to fall into more than one category.
For example, a case could contain both a sex and race discrimination claim. We handled
this problem in two ways.
First, we coded the most important claim first and used only the first basis of discrimina-
tion in the analysis below. This is appropriate if (most) plaintiffs believe that they have a
choice of only a single type of claim (from among race, sex, age; hiring, firing, retaliation;
and so on).
Table 6 also presents ordinary grouped logistic regressions, in which we ask whether
the probability of a race (or sex or age. . .) claim-regardless of any other claims also
made-changes over the business cycle. This is appropriate if plaintiffs' choices are not
seen as mutually exclusive.
I The data were selected from the same Administrative Office data tape used to con-
struct the population of employment discrimination cases and are described in more
detail in Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 14; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 3. The
cases were sampled over the period from 1972:3 through 1987:1, which substantially over-
laps, but is not identical to, the time frame used in the other regressions reported in the
paper.
TABLE 6
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS FOR THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON THE COMPOSITION OF
THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASELOAD
Degrees of Test p-
Distribution of Cases by: Freedoma Statisticb Value
Results from multinomial logit regressions:
Basis of discrimination (age, sex, race, other)
Basis of suit (Title VII, ADEA, § 1981, § 1983,
other)
Defendant's SIC code (mining, construction, dura-
ble manufacturing, nondurable manufacturing,
transport, utilities, wholesale/retail trade, fi-
nance, services, government)
Plaintiff's occupation (managerial, technical, ser-
vice, agricultural, operative, precision craft)
Plaintiff's race (black, white, other)
Type of discrimination (hiring, firing, demotion/pro-
motion, conditions of employment, retaliation,
other)
Results from binomial logit regressions:
Whether plaintiff is suing his or her current em-
ployer (yes/no)
Plaintiff's sex (male, female)
Whether plaintiff raises a Title VII claim (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff raises an ADEA claim (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff raises a § 1981 claim (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff raises a § 1983 claim (yes/no)
Whether age is a basis of discrimination (yes/no)
Whether sex is a basis of discrimination (yes/no)
Whether race is a basis of discrimination (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in hiring
(yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in firing
(yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in pay
(yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in demo-
tion/promotion (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in condi-
tions of employment (yes/no)
Whether plaintiff claims discrimination in retalia-
tion (yes/no)
6 6.84 .34
8 10.33 .24
18 19.12 .38
10 8.09 .62
4 3.48 .48
10 8.64 .57
1 1.31 .25
NoTE.-Likelihood ratio tests are based on grouped-data, multinomial logistic regressions using
quarterly data from 1972:2 to 1987:1. The variable in col. I is the dependent variable; each regression
used the same explanatory variables: TIME, TIME 2 , and the I- and 2-quarter lagged, detrended unem-
ployment rate. See text for further details concerning data and methods. ADEA = Age Discrimination
in Employment Act; SIC = Standard Industrial Classification.
I With K categories in the dependent variable and J restrictions, the test statistic has R = J x
(K - 1) degrees of freedom. In our case, J is always equal to 2 (for the two lagged values of the
unemployment rate that are excluded). Hence, there are R = 2K - 2 degrees of freedom.
I 2(L, - LR,) is distributed X2 with R degrees of freedom, where LR. is the log likelihood for the
unrestricted model with unemployment coefficients, LR, is the log likelihood for the model without
unemployment coefficients, and R is the number of restrictions imposed.
* Significant at the .05 level.
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effects (as captured by lagged, detrended unemployment rates) are zero. 45
Casual inspection reveals that the business cycle effect is not statistically
significant at conventional levels for any of the multinomial variables.
While not displayed here, the actual coefficients themselves were typi-
cally small in size and statistically insignificant.
We do find weak evidence of business cycle effects when categories
are treated one at a time. The probability of a case containing a claim
under § 1983, and the probability of a sex discrimination claim, do seem
to respond to the state of the economy. Hiring and firing claims also
appear somewhat sensitive to economic conditions. None of the other
dichotomous categories shows much sign of a business cycle effect, how-
ever.46 Moreover, in the cases of both hiring and firing discrimination,
the two unemployment coefficients have opposite signs, and the net mag-
nitude is contrary to one's expectations: they suggest that hiring cases
increase, and firing cases fall, during a recession.
In general, then, the results support our earlier analysis: the composi-
tion of cases does not change much over the course of the cycle, which
suggests that it is changes in case quality that drive the observed win
rate and settlement rate effects. 47 The next section considers-and re-
jects-some additional possible explanations for the cyclical pattern of
outcomes in employment discrimination litigation.
While this paper was in press, it occurred to us that the test for cycli-
cality in the composition of the caseload has relatively little power. That
is, the test is unlikely to reject the null hypothesis of no cyclicality, largely
because the data from our 1,100-case sample are not sensitive enough to
the business cycle. One way to see this is to use the data in Table 6 to
replicate the conclusions of Table 2. While the overall number of employ-
45 2(LR - LR,) is distributed X2 with R degrees of freedom, where LR, is the log likeli-
hood for the unrestricted model (with unemployment coefficients), LR, is the log likelihood
for the model without unemployment coefficients, and R is the number of restrictions
imposed. If the dependent variable is K-nomial, then constraining J coefficients to be equal
to zero imposes R = J(K - 1) restrictions. Since J is always equal to 2 in our analysis,
R = 2K - 2.
46 We also ran the same logistic regressions using 3- and 4-quarter lagged, detrended
unemployment rates instead of 1- and 2-quarter lags. Of the 13 dichotomous variables
describing case categories, only allegations of firing discrimination were significantly related
to the business cycle, using the test procedure described above.
47 The unemployment rate variables used in this analysis are measured at the national
level, rather than being city-specific. Since each city's unemployment rate is presumably
what drives the litigation behavior of its citizens, and since the local rate differs from the
national one by a random component in each quarter which we do not know, our explana-
tory variables are measured with error. As is well known, this biases the estimated coeffi-
cients toward zero, which tends to support our hypothesis of no business cycle effects,
weakening the authority of our tests.
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ment discrimination suits is obviously sensitive to the business cycle, we
found only a very slight sensitivity in the sample data used to estimate
the regression in Table 6. If these data do not reveal much of a business
cycle effect for the volume of suits (where we have strong reason to
believe it exists), they are unlikely to reveal an effect on the composition
of suits, which should be substantially weaker.
To compensate for this lack of power, we performed a variety of addi-
tional tests for cyclicality in the composition of the caseload. (These tests
and the results are described in detail in an appendix available from the
authors.) One alternative is to replicate the tests described above using an-
nual data on charges of employment discrimination filed with the EEOC,
since most claims of employment discrimination must be processed
through the EEOC before they can be filed in federal court. While there is
a small, insignificant business cycle effect on the volume of charges filed,
there is no appreciable effect of unemployment on the composition of
EEOC charges.
A second set of tests looks at the ratio of hiring to firing claims. Since
the two kinds of claims seem to move in opposite directions over the
cycle, their ratio should be more sensitive to the unemployment rate
than either hiring or firing claims taken by themselves. Even with this
specification, however, we find no evidence of business cycle effects in
either the EEOC or ABF sample data. In sum, while our tests may not
be very powerful, the results are consistent with our maintained hypothe-
sis that the business cycle does not influence the composition of the
employment discrimination caseload.
B. Changing Doctrine
Easiest to dismiss is the possibility that changing legal doctrine explains
any of the cyclical patterns we have discussed. Whether or not there has
been a long-term change in doctrine that might explain the falling win
rate,48 it is highly implausible that there is any relationship between
changes in legal doctrine and the business cycle. Moreover, even if one
assumed that courts were more sympathetic to plaintiffs who file during
economic downturns, this assumption would be consistent with the
higher rate of filings in downturns, but not with the lower win rate.
4 Note in Table 4 that the time trend on the plaintiff win rate is negative and statistically
significant. A change in doctrine is not the only explanation for the falling win rate. For an
alternative based on the accumulation of precedent, see Hylton, supra note 5.
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C. Changes in Discrimination
Cyclical movements in the amount of discrimination seem inherently
more plausible, although there is little empirical evidence to support their
existence. Since unemployment (beyond the level associated with normal
economic frictions) represents an excess supply of labor at the going
wage, it presents employers with an opportunity to pick and choose
among workers queuing for jobs. Just as minimum wage laws or unions
facilitate discrimination in the classic Becker-Posner analysis-by creat-
ing an excess supply of labor and giving employers scope to indulge in
discriminatory preferences-one might imagine that a macroeconomic
slump produces the same effects. Theory suggests, therefore, that dis-
crimination should rise during slumps, and this might be expected to
induce more case filings.49
But if discrimination is indeed higher during slumps, then the incremen-
tal cases induced by this greater discrimination should tend to be stronger
than the average base case (or at least no weaker). In this event, the
obvious prediction is that plaintiffs should win more (or at least, no fewer)
of the incremental cases that are filed at such times. In the Priest-Klein
model, for example, a rise in the defendant's average fault level should
raise the win rate, although by much less than the increase in defendants'
fault." In fact, we find exactly the opposite to be true: plaintiffs win less
often in the added cases filed when the unemployment rate is high. Thus,
either discrimination must fall during slumps, which seems unlikely, or
the movement of discrimination over the cycle cannot explain our results.
D. Changes in Relative Stakes
Can shifting relative stakes explain any of the cyclicality in win rates and
settlement rates? We begin by defining the ratio of the plaintiff's to the de-
fendant's stakes as R. 5 Since the selection model predicts that the party
with the larger stakes will prevail more often, the results presented earlier
49 The effect is only unambiguous in the absence of an antidiscrimination law, however.
When discrimination is illegal and back pay damages are available, the expected cost of
discrimination to employers also becomes a function of the business cycle. (This is simply
the flip side of the effect on plaintiff's expected benefits that we discussed earlier.) If
employers are more sensitive to the incentive effects of larger penalties than to the greater
opportunities for discrimination that a recession opens up for them, it is possible, although
unlikely, that discrimination might actually fall during slumps. See Donohue & Siegelman,
supra note 22, for an extended discussion.
50 See Table 1 of Priest & Klein, note 1 supra, at 22; they simulate moving the decision
standard, rather than the average fault level, but the consequences are the same.
5' That is, R = Stakes to Plaintiff/Stakes to Defendant.
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(in Tables 1-4) require that (1) R is less than unity, (2) R is decreasing over
time (since the win rate is falling), and (3) R moves procyclically. That is,
since plaintiffs win a larger share of the cases filed in a booming economy, R
must be greater in booms than in slumps to be consistent with the theory.
52
It is quite plausible that condition (1) holds-defendants may well have
reputation and adverse-precedent effects from losing a lawsuit which
would not be matched by symmetric gains to plaintiffs. One might also be
able to tell a story about why relative stakes should be falling over time
as required by condition (2). For example, if the stigma of being labeled a
discriminator has increased over time, relative stakes will be decreasing.
However, some simple algebra reveals that relative stakes should, if
anything, tend to move countercyclically, in violation of condition (3),
although the magnitude of this effect is likely to be rather small.
To see this, define Sp and Sd as the absolute stakes of plaintiff and
defendant respectively. By definition,
R = SP/Sd.
Suppose that the plaintiff's stakes are limited to her back pay award, J. Thus,
SP = J. As demonstrated earlier, J depends on the unemployment rate, so
J = J(U), with J' > 0. The defendant's stake in the litigation consists of the
back pay award, J, plus reputation or precedential effects, which we can de-
note by K, K > 0. Therefore, Sd = J + K. Presumably, K does not vary over
the business cycle, since the importance of reputation or precedent should not
depend on the unemployment rate. Therefore, we can write
R = J(U)I[J(U) + K],
and differentiating with respect to the unemployment rate, U, we have
aR/U = [J'(J + K) - J'J]/(J + K)2 = J'KI(J + K)2 > 0.
Intuitively, an increase in unemployment raises J for both plaintiffs and
defendants, but this increase in J represents a larger proportion of the
stakes for plaintiffs. This means that relative stakes (R) increase during
52 The nature of relative stakes implied by our results can be summarized by writing
R = R(U, t). The procyclical behavior of the win rate implies that aR/aU < 0, while the
negative time trend requires aR/at < 0.
It is conceivable, following Hylton, that the variance of the error in the plaintiff's estimate
of the true fault level could move procyclically or that the variance in defendants' error
could move countercyclically. Both of these prospects seem implausible.
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a slump, rather than decreasing as the selection model requires in order
to explain the falling win rate.53
In short, it does not seem possible as a matter of theory to explain the
cyclical movement of settlement and win rates by attributing them to
changes in relative stakes over the cycle.
V. CONCLUSION
This article shows how the relationship between the business cycle,
as measured by the national rate of unemployment, and all phases of
employment discrimination litigation can be used to examine the selection
of disputes for litigation.
The strict version of the selection model suggests that the plaintiff win
rate should not depend on any case-specific factors (other than the par-
ties' relative stakes), since these are all accounted for by both sides in
deciding whether or not to settle the case before it is adjudicated. In fact,
however, the influence of the business cycle can be detected in the plain-
tiff win rate, implying only partial selection in the settlement of employ-
ment discrimination disputes. The partial selection model also implies
that the unemployment rate should have a stronger influence on the vol-
ume of cases filed (and on settlement rates) than on the outcomes of
adjudicated cases. This is precisely what we find. Note that while the
settlement filter is not complete, it is powerful: when the unemployment
rate jumps from I standard deviation below to I standard deviation above
its mean, almost 85 percent of the incremental cases induced by this rise
will settle.
In sum, this article suggests an important lesson about the selection of
disputes for litigation: despite the theoretical and empirical attacks on
53 Ian Ayres has suggested to us that K may indeed vary over the business cycle. If
employers feel that losing a discrimination case in a slump has less precedential value than
losing a case filed in a boom, then dKIdU will be negative. If this is true, however, then
relative stakes are even more procyclical, since
R = J(U)/(J(U) + K(U))
implies
OR/aU = [J'K - K'J]I(J + K)2 > J'K/(J + K) 2 > 0, for K' < 0.
Thus, the assumption that K falls when U rises only strengthens the conclusions that relative
stakes should increase in a slump.
Any effect of the unemployment rate on relative stakes is likely to be quite small, how-
ever. Suppose that at an average unemployment rate, K = 3. Thus, R = 1/(1 + 3) =
0.25, and plaintiffs have only one-fourth as large a stake in litigation as defendants. Under
these conditions, a 10 percent increase in J will raise R by only 7.3 percent (from 0.25 to
0.268). If instead K = 0.25J, a 10 percent increase in J raises R only from 0.8 to 0.81 (an
increase of only 1.25 percent).
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the Priest-Klein model, we have shown that one of its basic predictions-
that weak cases tend to settle at a disproportionately high rate-is con-
firmed for our sample of federal court employment discrimination cases.
The array of empirical findings in this article should be useful to cabin
the speculations of theorists as they seek to develop better models of the
settlement process. The finding that weak cases are strongly winnowed
out is important not only for those who are interested in modeling the
process of settlement and litigation, however. It should also matter to
anyone who wants to draw conclusions about the law from the accessible
set of cases that are litigated to a final judgment (or even more narrowly,
from the set of cases that are appealed and generate an appellate de-
cision).
The evaluation of employment discrimination litigation through the in-
terpretive framework of the Priest-Klein model suggests that the low
plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination cases may simply reflect
the asymmetric nature of the stakes in such litigation. Rather than demon-
strating the poor quality of most plaintiffs' cases, the low win rate might
simply indicate that employers typically have more to lose from a nega-
tive outcome at trial than plaintiffs have to gain. Conversely, if our identi-
fying restrictions are sound, then it is fair to conclude that the employ-
ment discrimination cases that are induced by an economic downturn
tend to be lower-quality cases-at least as measured by the ultimate
plaintiff win rates at trial.5
4
Finally, we note that our test of the Priest-Klein hypothesis is not
premised on a simple finding that the model's predictions are confirmed.
We also consider, and reject, several alternative explanations for the
business cycle effects we observed. Since there are neither theoretical
nor empirical alternatives that seem capable of explaining why the win
rate and settlement rate vary over the business cycle, our confidence in
the validity of the Priest-Klein story is strengthened.
APPENDIX
EXPECTATION FORMATION
As in the standard version of the Priest-Klein model, whose general notation
we follow here, the plaintiff estimates her probability of winning based on her
estimate of the defendant's "fault level" and her knowledge of the decision stan-
m Conceivably, a firm that wished to engage in discriminatory discharges might find it
easier to disguise its true motives if the economy was trending down and other workers
were being fired because of it. In such an event, the recession is associated with a fall in
the plaintiff win rate because of a greater difficulty in proof, even though there is no decline
in the actual merits of the claim.
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dard as follows. Let Y' be the true level of defendant fault in the case. If the true
fault level is greater than the "decision standard," then the plaintiff will win if
the case is litigated; otherwise, the defendant will win.
55
Although the plaintiff knows both the decision standard and the amount of
damages she will receive (if she wins) at the time that the dispute occurs, she does
not observe the true fault level in the case. Instead, she forms her expectation of
the probability that she will win based on the fault level she actually observes,
which contains some error. We can define the plaintiff's (unbiased) estimate of
the fault level at the time the dispute occurs as
f, = Y' + E,
where F, is a random variable with a zero mean.56
Now assume that the decision standard is arbitrarily (and innocuously) rescaled
so that it is set at 0, and suppose that E, is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance a'. Then the plaintiff's estimate that she will prevail is
fil = PR(Y' > 01 kl) = F(Y' + E1), (Al)
where F(x) is just the probability that a normally distributed random variable with
variance oj is less than x. For convenience, we assume that the level of defendant
fault, Y', is also a random variable, which is uncorrelated with the business
cycle.
57
Substituting equation (Al) into equation (la) in the text yields a complete model
of the decision to file suit. Filing will occur whenever the plaintiff's estimate of
the likelihood that she will prevail (,61) exceeds the threshold value p . Alterna-
tively, the plaintiff will file when her asking price-defined by substituting ('61)
for p, into equation (la)-is positive.
The decision to settle depends on the behavior of both parties. But assuming
that each side estimates its probability of winning as described above, the logic
is sketched out in the text and is fairly straightforward.
55 Formally,
{ fY>decision standard.
PR(Plaintiff Win I Adjudicated Case) = I if Y' > decision standard,
This implies that there is no judicial error. For a consideration of the role of judicial error,
see Hylton, supra note 5.
5 Experimental evidence suggests that parties' estimates of fault level are subject to
self-serving bias (George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal Stud. 135 (1993)), and the tendency to believe one's own
case (more generally, one's own attribute) is better than it actually is. See, for example,
Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers? 47 Acta
Psychologica 143 (1981). However, if parties' lawyers have more experience estimating
fault levels and less psychological investment in a lawsuit than their clients, this should
work to reduce-if not eliminate-self-serving bias.
57 One might imagine that the amount of discrimination, and hence the average defen-
dant's fault level, would increase during slumps and fall during booms. Formally, this would
imply that Yr = flU), with f(U) greater than zero. We discuss this possibility in the final
section of the text.
